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KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-ATTEMPT BY SECURED
CREDITOR UNDER ARTICLE 9 TO EMULATE TRUSTEE
IN BANKRUPTCY
The Uniform Commercial Code,1 through Article 9, covering
secured transactions, seems designed to clarify and strengthen the
position of the secured creditor. The drafters of that article attempted
to provide the machinery and power necessary to resist the attack of
the trustee in bankruptcy under sections 60, 2 64,3 67,4 and 705 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act.6 This has been done in answer to the need
for more extensive and unimpeachable credit in our economy. Such
credit was not possible under the previous system where a creditor
could have his security interest in an article defeated because he did
not religiously follow the strict and cumbersome procedures required
by law This attempt to improve the creditors position will not go
unchallenged. There are areas where the potential conflict with the
trustee in bankruptcy is too great to allow success to be assumed. On
the side of the trustee is the fact that any irreconcilable conflict will
be decided in his favor7 Realizing this, a close examination will be
made of those areas where the Code attempts to improve the secured
creditors position against the trustee in bankruptcy.
8
AvrrxE-AcQuimRE PnoPTarY
An important feature of article 9 is the extension of the after-
acquired property clause to various types of security agreements. For
example, the creditor s interest in proceeds, 9 fixtures,'0 accessions," or
' Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited as UCC in the footnotes and
Code in the text).
2 30 Stat. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §96 (1950).
80 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §104 (1956).
430 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §107 (1952).
5 830 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110 (1952).
630 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1958).
7 Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
8 Although the Code became effective in Kentucky in 1960, the state had
been behind most American jurisdictions in fragmentary codification of the newly
developed law of chattel security. It had had no adequate treatment of con-
ditional sales, except to subject them generally to the filing requirements in the
chattel mortgage law. Nor did it have a trust receipt statute a factors lien
statute or an accounts receivable statute. Knpke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law
of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 368 (1960). Also, it has been virtually impossible
in Kentucky to obtain a lien that would shift and follow collateral as collateral
changed in form and substance. Spivack, Financing the Manufacturer: Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 897, 399 (1960). Not all of Ken-
tucky s former piecemeal legislation on security interests has been expressly
repealed. For possible conflicts and how the Kentucky court has handled them
in at least one case, see Whiteside & Lewis, Kentucky s Commercial Code-Some
Initial Problems in Security, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).
9 UCC §9-306.
10 UCC §9-313.
11 UCC §9-314.
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collateral under a floating lien,' 2 depends in some part on the ability
of the after-acquired property phase of the transaction to operate
favorably To provide the backbone needed by these devices, the
Code in section 9-204(3) 13 has expressly validated the after-acquired
property clause. This section not only allows the creditor a security
interest in after-acquired property, but it elevates the creditor s interest
to the status of a legal lien good against third parties.' 4 The main
purpose of the section is obvious-to circumvent the powers of the
trustee in bankruptcy contained in section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Under this section the trustee can set aside certain transfers (including
secured financing agreements) as preferences, even though there has
been strict compliance with the state law governing perfection, if the
transfer was within four months of bankruptcy and in full or partial
satisfaction of an antecedent debt.15
There has been considerable debate as to whether the after-
acquired property provisions of article 9 could be defeated by a
trustee in bankruptcy. One argument in the trustee's favor has been
that under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act on preferences, the
actual transfer of the property subject to the security interest in after-
acquired property occurs at a date subsequent to the security arrange-
ment and when the debt is antecedent.' Another argument is that
the after-acquired property clause might come within the condemna-
tion of equitable liens under section 60a(6).17
When dealing with the first argument it becomes necessary to
determine if the acquisition of a secured interest in after-acquired
property under a security agreement becomes a transfer for an ante-
cedent debt.'8 Standing alone, section 9-204(3) might tend to support
i2UCC §9-205.
'3 If after-acquired property is contemplated as security this must be spelled
out in the security agreement. Because the broad after-acquired property clause
is meant to apply to the commercial transaction exclusively, article 9 does contain
certain limitations on its use. An after-acquired property clause cannot create an
effective security interest in consumer goods as additional security unless the
consumer has acquired the goods witlun ten days after the secured party has
made the loan to the consumer or advances other value. UCC §9-204(4) (a).
"There are no limitations regarding the use of the after-acquired property clause
in transactions involving a businessman or commercial debtor.' Spivack, Secured
Transactions 31 (1960).
14 UCC §9-204, official comment 2.
i All other elements of a preference listed in §60a(1) also must be present.
Also, under §60b, the trustee must prove that the creditor had actual knowledge
or reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
10 Kennedy, The Trustee tn Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial
Code; Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518, 546
(1960).
"7 Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 411 417 (1958).
i8 Subject to the exception provided in section 60a(7), a transfer, where the
debtor received a new consideration at the time of his execution of the transfer
(Continued on next page)
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the trustee s claim of antecedent debt based on a time difference in the
passage of consideration to the debtor and the attachment of the
security interest m after-acquired property But section 9-10819 rescues
the creditor by providing that the security interest m after-acquired
collateral is deemed to be
taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the
debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary
course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant
to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value
is given.20
The main objection to these two sections is that they resurrect the
doctrine of relation back by which transfers, finally consummated
within the four month period preceeding bankruptcy, escaped con-
demnation under section 60 because they were viewed as having
occurred at an earlier time when the parties first made their agree-
ment. The Chandler Act of 1938, as interpreted in Corn Exchange
Bank v. Klauder,21 eliminated the doctrine of relation back. True, a
new subdivision was added to section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
22
qualifying the Klauder interpretation by defining a grace period of
twenty-one days within which perfection of a transfer in certain
situations would be allowed without jeopardy to the contemporaneity
of the consideration. 28 But this amendment in no way destroys the
general principle that whether a debt is deemed antecedent to the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
but where the transfer was not perfected until some subsequent time, is one made
for or on account of an antecedent debt. It is deemed to have been made only
when perfected, and where the debtor s obligation to Ins transferee for the con-
sideration previously received (at the time the transfer was executed between the
Sarties) antedated the perfection of the transfer. 3 Collier, Bankruptcy §60.39
14th ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as Collier.)
19 Tis section admittedly is designed to answer any charge of antecedent
debt by the trustee. UCC §9-108, comment 1. See note 27 mnfra and accompany-
ing text.
20 It has been suggested that §9-108 is unnecessary and even dangerous.
Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clause under the Code, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194, 219 (1959). His contention is
that §9-204 and other sections bearing on the perfection of security interests are
effective by themselves to create the desired result-to raise the security interest
under an after-acquired property clause to the state of a legal lien. See note 33
supra. He feels that §9-108 takes the appearance of a "suspender clause," and
that it displays a lack of confidence on the part of the draftsmen in the effective-
ness of the other provisions to stand alone.
21318 U.S. 434 (1943).
22 30 Stat 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §96 (1950).
23 Under the Code, no time is stipulated, except in the case of a security
interest in negotiable documents or instruments obtained pursuant to the provisions
of §9-304(4), where a twenty-one-day grace period is given. It nght be thought
that the twenty-one-day limit of §60a(7) would apply to all after-acquired
property clauses under the Code, or to none of them if they take on a legal color.
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transfer must be determined as of the time the transfer becomes fully
and completely perfected.
24
The trustees final point in this argument against considering the
transfer of after-acquired collateral to have been given for new value,
is that the Code itself prohibits a security interest from attaching to
after-acquired collateral until the debtor acquires any rights m the
collateral.25 This is true even though a fully perfected security interest
may pass automatically to the secured party as soon as the rights are
acquired by the debtor. The chronology of the passage of the con-
sideration and the transfer remains unaffected by such an automatic
perfection. Of course the transfer can be considered complete before
the acquisition of the collateral by relating the perfection back to the
time of the debtors receipt of the consideration. However, any attempt
to escape the impact of section 60 by employing the doctrine of
relation back is dangerous procedure.26 The drafters of the Code
counter by saying that "interests in after-acquired property have
never been considered as involving transfers for antecedent debt
merely because of the after-acquired feature, nor should they be so
considered."27 Perhaps the drafters comment will be supported by
other provisions in the Code.
It has been suggested that instead of considering after-acquired
collateral as separate from the original security agreement, the Code
might consider it to be security merely substituted for the original
collateral. 28  Substitution of collateral, even within the four-month
period, does not amount to a preferential transfer since there is no
24 Since a transfer of property which is inherently for an antecedent debt
cannot be cured by any after-acquired property clause, every transaction attacked
by the trustee as a transfer for antecedent debt must of necessity be tested on its
time sequence. 3 Collier §60.39 (1950).2 5 "It should be kept in mind that the time of perfecting is not necessarily the
time of filing or of change of possession; perfection occurs when the last of four
events has happened. In some cases the last step may be filing or delivery of
possession; mn another case, the last step may be the making of the agreement, or
the giving of the advance, or, particularly as to after-acquired property, the
acquisition of rights by the debtor." Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code Without Help or Hindrance of the "Floating Lien,"
15 Bus. Law. 373, 383 (1960).26 Kennedy, supra note 16, at 549.
27 UCC §9-108, comment 1.28 Comment, supra note 17, at 415. The strongest reliance the Code puts on
the idea of a perfected security interest continuing into substituted collateral, is in
its treatment of secured interests in returned or repossessed goods in §9-305(5).
If the creditor has secured his interest in the goods by filing before the goods are
sold §9-306(5) allows the original security interest to continue in the returned
goods. The security interest, as originally perfected, reattaches to the goods upon
their return. It is clear that in the usual business transaction, sale of the goods in
question would end the security interest in the goods and transfer it to the
proceeds. And any security interest in the proceeds would end after ten days
unless that interest was perfected before or after the sale. It then appears that
(Continued on next page)
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depletion of the bankrupt's assets.29 But this idea of substitution can
operate effectively only after the debtor has acquired collateral with
the money originally advanced by the creditor, thus avoiding a real
conceptual hurdle against treating the money advanced as collateral.30
The best possible retort found in the Code is that since the secured
party s rights in the after-acquired collateral have in fact at all times
been superior to those of a judgment lien creditor, the transfer of such
security interest should be deemed to have been made at the time of
the original agreement creating the lien, thereby avoiding the ante-
cedent debt problem. But the strength of this argument depends upon
the Codes success in answering the trustees second argument against
the after-acquired property clause, z.e., can it escape the stigma of an
equitable lien condemned by section 60a(6)?
Section 60a(6) announces the rule that "the recognition of
equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal liens have
not been employed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy
of " section 60. This section, by its own terms, is applicable only
when the creditor has neglected to employ available means required
by state law for the perfection of a legal lien.3i Under the Code, the
recordation of the original security agreement is all that is required in
order to perfect the interest in after-acquired property against all
third parties other than buyers in the ordinary course of busmess.m
Therefore, as long as the creditor does whatever is required by the
Code for the perfection of a legal lien, his security interest in the
after-acquired property is not subject to attack on the basis that it is
only an equitable lien.
Since section 60a(6) cannot and does not apply to security
interests in equitable assets, it is suggested that it must apply to
equitable interests which arise out of the imperfect creation of
intended legal interests.33 Even if the Code creates an equitable lien
as supplementary to a legal lien, if the creditor perfects both in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
goods, has revived a security interest rather than continued it. For the possible
positions of the trustee against such a situation see Kennedy, supra note 16, at 534.
29 3 Collier §60.21 (1961).
30 At that stage in the process the creditor is really no better off than an
unsecured creditor. It is the initial substitution that makes hin a secured creditor.31 Under §60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act:
[A] transfer of [personal] property shall be deemed to have
been made when it became so far perfected that no subsequent
lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings
on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the trans-
feree.
32 See UCC §9-204, comment 2.
the Code, by allowing the perfected security interest to reattach to the returned3 3 Hanna, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 471, 485
(Continued on next page)
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accordance with all the requirements of the Code, then section 60a(6)
cannot apply Since it does not apply and since his interest is superior
to that of a judgment lien creditor, his interest must in fact be a legal
mterest.3
4
The Codes strength in rebutting the equitable lien argument can
easily be the basis of refuting the argument that the debt was ante-
cedent. The Codes effort to raise the after-acquired clause to a legal
status may then be said to be effective.
PURCHASE MONEY SECUBrrM INTERESTS
All security interests, except the purchase money security,35 must
be perfected prior to the debtors bankruptcy36 in order to avoid the
challenge of the trustee under sections 70c 3 7 and 70e.38 Section 70c is
the "strong arm" clause giving the trustee the standing of a hypo-
thetical lien holder by legal proceedings as of the date of bankruptcy
Under section 70e the trustee is afforded the assistance of law apart
from the Bankruptcy Act, enabling creditors to avoid transfers made
by the bankrupt. However, the purchase-money security interest may
be perfected even after bankruptcy of the debtor-purchaser if done
within ten days after the collateral comes into the possession of the
debtor.39 It should be noticed that the grace period of ten days
operates to cut off only the interests of intervening lien creditors or
bulk purchasers.40 Other intervening interests would not be cut off by
the filing.41 Section 9-301(3) leaves no doubt about the Codes classi-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1960). In his treatment of the after-acquired clause under the Code, Hanna is
careful not to term such an interest an equitable lien or a legal lien. He terms it a
legal interest, sdillfully avoiding the pitfalls of both under §60 of the Bankruptcy
Act.
34 This conclusion is also reached by Friedman, supra note 12, at 215.
35 For the Code s definition of purchase money security interest, see §9-107.
3. The creditor usually can perfect a security interest under the Code against
the trustee by filing a financing statement. Section 9-302(1) exempts from the
filing requirement certain transactions. For most types of property, taking of
possession by the creditor is an alternative method of perfection. §9-805. But
certain kinds of transactions have special perfecting requirements. Filing is the
only method of perfecting accounts, contract rights, and other similar intangibles.
§9-305, comment 1. Taking possession is the only method of perfecting
security interests in mstruments. §9-304(1). Instruments as used here include
negotiable instruments and investment securities but not security agreements them-
selves, which are called chattel paper in §9-105. Security interests in chattel
paper and negotiable documents of title (such as bills of lading and warehouse
receipts) may be perfected by filing or taking possession. §§9-304, 9-805.
380 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110 (1952).
38 Ibid.
39 UCC §9-801.
4 ' UCC §9-301(2).
41 UCC §9-301(2) & comment 5. But the creditor-seller can receive protec-
tion against a subsequent security interest, created during or after the ten day
penod, by filmn prior to the perfection of the subsequent security interest where
filing is reqmred for perfection. Spivack, Secured Transactions 97 (1960).
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fication of the interest of the trustee in bankruptcy He is a lien
creditor. Perfection within this ten day grace period relates back to
the instant the buyer acquired the collateral. Despite the opposition
of bankruptcy law and the policy considerations adverse to the doc-
trine of relation back,42 there is no reason to doubt that the holder of
a purchase-money security interest would prevail against the trustee if,
and only if, the interest is perfected m the time specified by the Code.43
Despite this exclusive haven for the holder of a purchase-money
security interest, two common pitfalls may trap the creditor-seller.
Relying on misinformation he may think that bankruptcy is the date
of cleavage. If this leads him to delay perfecting his interest after the
insolvent debtor has filed for bankruptcy he may lose Ins purchase
money security interest. To perfect this interest after the debtor files
and beyond the ten day grace period would not be fatal under sections
70c and 70e, unless bankruptcy intervened before the perfection,44
but it would be vulnerable to attack as a voidable preference under
section 60. The purchase-money consideration would become ante-
cedent by virtue of the effect of section 60a(2) to postpone the
transfer until the date of perfection.45
Also, the creditor-seller may be misled by section 60a(7) of the
Bankruptcy Act which allows a grace period of twenty-one days for
perfecting a security interest. He may rely on tis to delay his
perfecting of the purchase-money security interest beyond ten days.
Such a delay is not authorized since the twenty-one day period cannot
exceed that provided by applicable state law Where the Code
applies, the ten day grace period is the maximum available.
PROcEE s
The Code recognizes the secured party s right to proceeds received
by the debtor on disposition of the collateral.46 A perfected security
42For development of the doctrine of "relation-back" in bankruptcy law,
see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
43 The validity of any security interest as against the trustee under §§70c and
70e ordinarily depends on state law. 4 Collier §70.82(3) (1959).44 While the holding in Constance v. Harver, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954)
prevailed, the trustee might have intervened successfully if the purchase-money
security interest were not perfected within ten days on the theory that under the
"strong-armd clause of §70c of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee could upset
security transactions entered into years before the bankruptcy as long as he could
posit this right. But this rule was overturned recently by Lewis v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), which held that the "strong-arm" clause gives
the trustee the status of a hypothetical lien creditor as of the time when the
petition in bankruptcy is filed-not a day sooner. See 2 B.C. Ind. and Com. L.
Rev. 372 (1961).
45 3 Collier 917-20 (1961), MacLachlan, Bankruptcy, §266 (1956).
46 UCC §9-206.
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interest in the collateral continues in the identifiable proceeds as a
perfected interest for at least ten days.47 At the end of that time the
perfected interest in the proceeds ceases, unless the filed financial
statement covering the original collateral also explicitly covered the
proceeds. If not, the secured party must perfect his interest in the
proceeds themselves by filing a new financing statement.48
The Code further provides that in the event of the debtors bank-
ruptcy, the secured party has a security interest in the debtor s cash
and bank accounts, whether they are identifiable or non-identifiable.
This interest is equal to the amount of cash proceeds received and
commingled or deposited within the ten days before commencing
bankruptcy proceedings, less the amount of cash proceeds received
by the debtor and paid over to the secured party during that period.49
The real change in existing law relates to non-identifiable cash
proceeds. Although essentially the same as section 10 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, section 9-306(4) of the Code attempts to nnprovu,
the secured party s interest in the proceeds held by the bankrupt by
designating it a "secured mterest" instead of a "priority" While it is
clear that the Uniform Trust Receipts Act intended the creditors
interest to be a secured interest, the careless use of the word "priority"
gave the trustee an advantage which he successfully exploited under
section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.50 The Code eliminates the trustees
attack under this section.
The secured party s position, however, may be vulnerable. 51 The
trustees strongest attack would appear to come from section 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act, pertaining to statutory liens. This section attempts
to regulate the extent to which state laws regarding priority of pay-
47 UCC §9-306(3).
48 UCC §9-206(3), comment 2(b).
49 UCC §9-306(4 , comment 2(a).50 The trustees success is somewhat in doubt lately. While it is still held by
some that under §10 of the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act the creditor has no more
than a pnority on distribution, which is ineffective in bankruptcy, at least one
court has held that the section gives rise to a technical lien valid against the
trustee. In Re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959). See also
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1956).
5i It might be thought that the trustee could attack the creditors interest in
the proceeds as a preference not allowed under §60 of the Bankruptcy Act, much
the same as after-acquired property transferred to satisfy an antecedent debt.
But §9-306(8) of the Code counters by providing that the security interest in
the proceeds is a continuously perfected interest stemming from the security
interestin the onal collateral. Comment 2(b) further strengthens this position
by adding that the four-month period for calculating a voidable preference in
bankruptcy begins with the date of the secured party s obtaimng the security
interest in the onginal collateral and not with the date of his obtaining control of
the proceeds. In any event, no attack was ever made by the trustee against the
proceeds under §60. Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 411, 422 (1958). This may be
true because the trustee was so successful under §64.
19621
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ment in bankruptcy proceedings will be subject to federal priorities
specified in sections 64 and 67 52 A valid security interest, even though
created by state statute, will escape the effect of section 67 So, the
controversy will be reduced to the question of whether the creditor
has a valid security interest or merely a state-created priority of dis-
tribution.53
The trustee will have several bases of contention that this interest
is a statutory lien. First, the Bankruptcy Act does not define statutory
lien. This label is attached only to certain state-created liens listed in
section 67 54 Second, the Code s definition of a security interest in non-
identifiable proceeds, necessarily appearing in a state statute, amounts
to no more than one of the statutory liens not listed in section 67,
thereby being reduced to the status of a mere priority under section 64.
Third, the Code allows a security interest in non-identifiable proceeds
only upon the debtors insolvency 55 The inference is that since the
creditor is unable to reach the non-identifiable proceeds m an action
independent of bankruptcy proceedings, the Code constitutes state
legislation in an area pre-empted by federal law.
5 6
But the creditor can refute these arguments. 57 He first can argue
that the Code expressly does not apply to statutory liens.58 Then he
may argue that section 9-306 creates an interest founded on a contract
and is really a method of regulating the mode of enforcement of
consensual liens.59 This is consistent with section 67 of the Bankruptcy
Act since the lien created or recognized by statute within the meaning
of that section arises primarily from an economic relationship defined
by the legislature and not from the terms of a contract providing for
security Applying this meaning to "other classes of persons,"60 the
security interest under section 9-306 clearly is contractual rather than
statutory, even though without the statute the agreement of the
52An example of a statutory lien within the meaning of §67(b) is the
priority of payment to an artisans lien authorized by §9-310.
534 Collier §67.20 (1959).
5430 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §107 (1952).
55 UCC §9-306(4) (d).
56 Spivack, Secured Transactions 106 (1960).
57 Litigation under §10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act will be of little
assistance since the Act plainly allowed the creditor an interest in non-identifiable
proceeds enforceable in any event. Compare UCC §9-306(4)(d) and UTRA
§0( b).
58UCC §9-102(2).
59 Kennedy, supra note 16, at 583.
60 Section 67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act validates, against the trustee in
bankruptcy, "statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechamcs, land-
lords, or other classes of persons." It should be noted that another argument for
not considering the security interest created in §9-306 as a statutory lien within
the meaning of §67 are excluded from the general provisions of Article 9. See
UCC §9-104(b).
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parties would not have created a valid lien under non-bankruptcy
law.6'
Beyond this the creditor might contend that it is unnecessary n
any event to make the distinction between identifiable and non-identi-
fiable cash proceeds n actions independent of bankruptcy In fact,
cash proceeds, identifiable or not, are mentioned only in section
9-806(4), which deals with the collection of proceeds in bankruptcy
There is an obvious reason for this. If the solvent debtor is recalcitrant
in honoring the creditors perfected security interest in the cash
proceeds, judicial relief would be available. If it appeared that there
might be some difficulty in tracing the proceeds for the purpose of
identification, the creditor could elect to forego the effort and stand
as an unsecured creditor. Since the debtor is solvent, success would
be assured in either situation. A provision in the Code that the
security interest continued in the identifiable and non-identifiable cash
proceeds collected by solvent debtors would have been superfluous.
So the security interest in non-identifiable cash proceeds is sig-
nificant only when the debtor is insolvent. A judgment lien in that
instance could easily be avoided by the trustee. Tracing the proceeds
is tedious and sometimes based on fiction (although used with some
success under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.) Then it is important
to recognize that the creditor has a perfected security interest which
should be satisfied by cash proceeds resulting from the sale of his
collateral, regardless of his ability to identify certain cash as that
actually paid for the collateral. The creditors claim is not for
specific money, but for a portion of the cash receipts necessarily
resulting from the sale. The correct way to think of the security
interest is in terms of a res or a single entity continuously changing
but always in existence.62
FLoATn=G LmN
The term "floating lien" does not appear in the text of the Code,
but there can be no doubt that it is the referent of section 9-205. The
purpose of the section is to define and expressly validate the floating
lien.63 The Code treats the floating lien as a security interest in which
the creditor permits the debtor to use, commingle and dispose of all
or part of the collateral without having to account for the proceeds
61 4 Collier §67.20 (1959). This interpretation is consistent with the clear
legislative purpose to subject such forms of inventory financing to the provisions
of §60 dealing with preferences. Countrymen, The Secured Transactions Article
of Te Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 76 (1951).
62 See notes 94-96 tnfra and accompanying text.
63 UCC §9-205, comment 1.
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or without having to replace the collateral with similar articles." The
lien floats from original collateral over to substituted collateral and is
continuously in existence. Tins is essentially the definition as it has
always been understood.6 5
The main feature of the floating lien is that the debtor may dispose
of the collateral as he wishes without accounting to the creditor.66
This lack of accountability led the courts to strike down the floating
lien.67 It was held to be fraudulent in law, without regard to the
degree of perfection by filing or otherwise, 8 because of the deception
of apparent ownership m the debtor by allowing hun full dominon
and control over the collateral.6 9 Although this judicial treatment of
the floating lien first was focused on mortgages of stock n trade,70 it
was quickly extended to all types of collateral used for security by the
familiar decision in Benedict v. Ratner 71 Although that decision
represented only the law of New York, many other courts followed its
lead and it is still the majority rule72 Some courts extended the
applicability of the rule of the Benedict case by holding such a lien
valid only if the financier took "absolute domiion" over the collat-
eral.7 3 This meant that the entire lien was lost if the debtor was
permitted to exercise any control over the collateral, original or sub-
stituted.7 4 Even though some courts treated the floating lien n a far
64 UCC §9-205.65 Coogan, supra note 25, at 374. Mr. Coogan points out that there is no
clearly defined meaning outside the Code, but emphasizes that the most essential
element of the floating lien is the lack of accountability required of the debtor.6 6 Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 889 (1959).67 Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Lukns v. Anrd, 73 U.S. (6 Wall)
78 (1867).
68 Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 Col. L. Rev. 1338,
1339 (1939).6 9 Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Prof. Kennedy points out that
this misleading nature of the floating lien bnngs it within the condemnation of the
doctrine of reputed ownership and all that to which it applies. Kennedy, supra
note 16, at 540.
70 Cohen and Gerber, supra note 68, at 1340.
71268 U.S. 353 (1925). Tis case also changed the theory of the rule by
wich floating liens were held invalid. Mr. Justice Brandeis concluded: "It rests
not upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon a lack of
ownership because of domimon reserved. It does not raise a presumption of fraud.
It imputes fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion mconsistent
with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien." 268 U.S. at 363.
72 4 Collier §70.77 (1959). Since the adoption of the Code by 18 states, as of
June 1962, this majority may well he cut down to a minority, depending on how
the courts accept the Code s treatment of the floating lien. Before the adoption
of the Code, Kentucky s position was against the validity of the floating lien.
Vogler, Wagner & Co. v. Smith, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 364 (1888), looked favorably on
stock in trade mortgages when they applied to exasting stock; but, Sandy Valley
Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 103 S.W.2d 307 (1937), held such
mortgages invalid as to after-acquired stock.
73 Zydney v. New York Credit Men s Ass n, 113 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1940).74 Knpke, The "Secured Transactions Provsons of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 35 Va. L. Rev. 577, 590 (1949).
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more practical and favorable manner,75 it was not enough to stem the
wave of dissatisfaction among creditors that resulted in corrective
legislation.
76
These efforts did not completely achieve the intended result. The
Factors Lien Acts offered the greatest potential but rendered the
least service, either because most lawyers tended to use some other
device or few of them understood it.77 The other devices most often
used were the conditional sale, the trust receipt and the chattel
mortgage. But the very nature of these devices required the use of a
multitude of security agreements and a continuous system of filing.
78
While this was done with the idea of giving the desired respectability
to the floating lien, it resulted in nothing more than tracking the
progress of one investment through a series of devices, any one of
which could stand alone as a valid security interest.79 Tis meticulous
formality defeated the purpose of the floating lien, that is, to provide
freely-flowing, continuing financing to a going business concern. The
public interest is served by allowing the businessman to offer a
continuously changing and current inventory To require strict appli-
cation of the proceeds to the debt would make the business self-
liquidating. Although the end result of a floating lien can be achieved
by using the various pre-code devices, they actually drag down the
liens effectiveness by sheer weight of formality 
8 0
The Code not only nullifies the rule of the Benedict case, but also
establishes a new method of executing what was in fact a floating lien.
Section 9-205 provides that no security interest is invalid because of
the "lack of accountability" to the creditor. This section announces the
purpose of the Code, to establish the floating lien as a working and
workable security device. But it is left to other sections to provide the
machinery These other sections permit the following: (1) notice
filing with respect to any kind of collateral by a brief finacial statement
which does no more than give the signatures and addresses of the
debtor and the secured party and indicates the types of property to be
754 Collier §70.77 (1959). Collier points out that the rule of the Benedict
case has received the most severe application in New York, and from the federal
courts a pplying New York law. Other courts have displayed varying degrees of
laxity, while some have refused to apply it at all.
76 Ibid.
77 Coogan, supra note 25, at 876.
78 Id. at 377. Coogan points out that these techmcalities of the various devices
frequently prevented the parties from creating the particular kind of security
interest for which they bargained.
79 The various "single purpose" devices were probably allowed to develop
because they "policed" what was really one transaction y requrmng penodic
checks by the creditor on the collateral, such as: daily accounting for collections,
special bank accounts, custodians to receive collections. Knpke, supra note 74, at
591.
s0 Coogan, supra note 25.
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covered;8' (2) the debtor to use any or all of his personal property as
collateral, including after-acquired property, and including the pro-
ceeds or new property substituted for the original collateral;82 (3) the
debtor to give present security for future advances; 3 (4) the debtor
to exercise such dominion or control over the collateral as may be
agreed upon between the parties;84 (5) certain after-acquired property
to be considered to have been given for present consideration rather
than for an antecedent debt. 5 Section 9-205 ties together the possible
use of these sections and gives added strength by openly approving
the floating lien.
The combined effect of these sections is to bypass section 70e of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act88 which was employed by the trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid the effects of a floating lien. This section declares
null and void any agreement which is held fraudulent by federal or
state law for any reason. But the floating lien as established by the
Code may not escape entirely the attack of the trustee. The main
attack might come under section 60a, with the trustee contending that
the floating lien creates a series of antecedent debts.8 7 Since a floating
lien contemplates substitution of collateral from time to time, it would
appear that the secured party s consideration could not pass con-
temporaneously with the debtors obligation to repay. Since this
creates what is termed an antecedent debt,8 8 and since a preference
in bankruptcy must relate to an antecedent debt,8 9 the floating lien
would be subject to the full force of section 60 as a preferential trans-
fer.90 The trustee, in this connection, might point out that the Code
itself does not consider a security interest to be perfected until the
debtor has rights in the collateral.91
There are at least two possible answers to this argument. First, this
is not one of the evils section 60 is intended to remedy. This section
81 UCC §9-402.
82UCC §§9-204, -306. See also text supra, A.TR-AcQURED PRoPERTY,
p. 154 and PRocEEs, p. 160.
83 UCC §9-204(5) & comment 8.
84 UCC §9-205.
85 UCC §9-108.
8880 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110 (1952).
87 Kennedy, supra note 16, at 541.88 In re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1942).
89 MacLachian, Bankruptcy §255 (1956).
90 This argument is the familiar one applied to after-acqured property
clauses, agreements concernng proceeds of the collateral, and so on. See text
supra, AFrER-ACQRED PRoPETY, p. 154, and PRocEEs, p. 160. Section 60a(7) of
the Bankruptcy Act, passed m 1950, tended to ease the effect of the preference
section by allowing the creditor twenty-one days to perfect his interest. But even
prompt perfection cannot cure what was from the first an antecedent debt. Id.
at §266.
91 UCC §§9-204, -803.
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is aimed at the situation where the creditor extends money without
security and claims the collateral on an "after-acquired" basis. 2 Under
the Code notice is required of the creditor who lends on a secured
basis. As soon as the debtor has rights in the collateral, the security
interest attaches. The creditor takes every step possible to secure a
legal lien at the earliest possible time. Section 60a(6) implies that no
preference is created m such a situation.9 3 The second answer is more
impressive. A shifting body of collateral may be treated as a single
entity effectively hypothecated by the agreement and the act of notice-
filing.94 This idea is not new Over fifty years ago Williston remarked
that it was desirable to think of stock in trade as having a continuous
existence as an entity regardless of the articles which compose it.95
Perhaps the best analysis of this idea was advanced by Judge
Magruder in a case involving an application of the New Hampshire
Factors Lien Act.
[Tihe res which is the subject of the lien is the stock in
trade, conceived of as a unit presently and continuously in existence-
a "floating mass," the component elements of which may be constantly
changing without affecting the identity of the res So conceived,
it is not inconsistent with the existence of the lien or floating charge
on the inventory, as it may be made up at any particular time, that
the borrower is free to withdraw an item from stock for sale in the
regular course or business, without any obligation to account to the
lien holder for the proceeds. 96
The reasoning applied here would combat the trustee s argument that
each new item must be treated as separate collateral. The collateral
is the res in which the creditor can have only one security interest.
The issue presented to the trustee in bankruptcy by the floating
lien has not been resolved legally by the courts applying the Code, nor
has it been resolved academically in the periodicals. The Code leaves
no doubt of its acceptance of the floating lien. The only question is
whether the courts will consider the Code in conflict with federal law
William P Snyder
92 Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
on the Corporate Indenture, 69 Yale L.J. 203, 244 (1959).
03 The Bankruptcy Act, §60a( 6) provides that "the recognition of equitable
liens where available means of perfecting legal lieas have not been employed is
declared to be contrary to the policy of this section." Coogan & Bok, supra note
92, point out that the negative implications of this are that the Bankruptcy Act
recognizes equitable liens where all steps have been taken to secure a legal lien,
and from which a legal lien will follow. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.94 Hanna, supra note 33, at 486.95 Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Property, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 557, 581
(1906).96 Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 881 (1st Cir. 1951). New
Hampshire has since adopted the Code.
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